References – Page 16 – Public Intelligence Blog

2013/10/102013/10/10

David Sabow: BETRAYAL – Toxic Murder of US Marines and US Government Cover-Up

02 Infectious Disease, 03 Environmental Degradation, 07 Health, 07 Other Atrocities, 09 Justice, 11 Society, Corruption, DoD, Government, Idiocy, Ineptitude, Military, Officers Call

This should be read by everyone who believes that those within the DC-BELTWAY are here to protect and represent you and your families. I can personally tell you how vicious they can be when you are about to expose them. They assassinated my brother, Colonel James e. Sabow, USMC, Jimmy. and they have tried everything on me -short of murder. They have attacked me through the IRS, my professional medical credentials, the narcotics control agency, the Social security Administration, to name a few. My representatives in my state of South Dakota (past and present) won't even talk to me after they realize what has occurred. Senators Daschle, Tim Johnson, Larry Pressler and John Thune have all have all demonstrated their cowardice and their true colors. Each and everyone of them know that Col. Sabow was murdered and most of them suspect or know why. But they all remain silent! What character!

BETRAYAL is a true story of U.S. Marines who were exposed to carcinogens, injured, and continue for fight for health care and compensation. This nonfiction account was written by two U.S. Marines who were both assigned to the most contaminated site at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA. Senior Marine Corps leadership were involved in murder, crime scene cover-up, narcotrafficking (cocaine, the drug of choice), the shredding of records, and the denial of injuries from exposure to deadly contaminants at both El Toro and Camp Lejeune, NC. The connection is not a square peg in a square hole, but its damn close. Thousands of veterans and their families were once stationed at El Toro, the premier Marine Corps jet fighter base closed in July 1999. Legislation to provide health care for Camp Lejeune, an active military installation, was passed in the 112th Congress. However, no veteran compensation was included in the Janey Ensminger Act. None of the veterans that served aboard these two installations were notified of their exposure to deadly contaminants when it was discovered resulting in both bases earning Superfund Cleanup Site status. Many veterans have died without ‘connecting the dots’ between their killing diseases and military service.

2013/09/302013/09/30

Penguin: Book Review by Andrew Bacevich — Thank You For Your Service [The Unraveling]

07 Health, 11 Society, Civil Society, Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, Government, Idiocy, Ineptitude, IO Deeds of War, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence, Threats

Book review: ‘Thank You for Your Service’ by David Finkel

By Andrew Bacevich

Andrew J. Bacevich teaches at Boston University. His new book is “Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country.”

Nominally a sequel to The Good Soldiers, his 2009 account of an American infantry battalion at war in Iraq, David Finkel’s new book actually serves as a perfect companion to George Packer’s recent bestseller, The Unwinding. Like Packer, Finkel examines the human detritus left in the wake of fraudulent promises and collapsed illusions. In The Unwinding, Packer contemplates the fate of those victimized by cataclysmic economic change. In Thank You for Your Service, Finkel looks at those victimized by egregious military malpractice.

The post-industrial, high-tech, information-age economy unveiled near the end of the 20th century supposedly offered a template for permanent prosperity. The Great Recession upended such expectations. Although some Americans have gotten very rich indeed, far larger numbers of ordinary citizens find themselves unemployed and unemployable. With impressive sensitivity, Packer tells their story.

Concocted at about the same time, a post-industrial, high-tech, information-age approach to waging war supposedly offered a template for assured victory. Iraq and Afghanistan have shredded such pretensions. Although some high-ranking military and civilian officials found ways to cash in, far larger numbers of ordinary soldiers (and their families) suffered, many of them grievously. In painful, intimate and at times almost voyeuristic detail, Finkel tells their story.

More specifically, Finkel, a reporter with The Washington Post, attends to what he calls the “after war.” His concern is with the soldiers who return from the war zone bearing wounds — and with the loved ones on whom those wounds also become imprinted. Above all, he is concerned with wounds that may not be fully visible: the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury and related conditions that affect roughly a half-million younger veterans. Make that a half-million and counting.

To translate this disturbing statistic into flesh and blood, Finkel checks in on some of the soldiers featured in his previous book. What he finds is anger, anxiety, shame, depression, guilt, sleeplessness, self-abuse, spousal abuse, child abuse, alcohol abuse, drug abuse and suicidal tendencies, sometimes acted on, sometimes not. Shouting matches, crying jags and bizarre behavior along with guns and two-pack-a-day smoking habits abound, but not much in the way of useful therapy. Of one soldier, Finkel writes: “He began to take sleeping pills to fall asleep and another kind of pill to get back to sleep when he woke up. He took other pills, too, some for pain, others for anxiety. He began to drink so much vodka that his skin smelled of it, and then he started mentioning suicide.”

Continue reading “Penguin: Book Review by Andrew Bacevich — Thank You For Your Service [The Unraveling]”

2013/08/27

Eagle: Charles Hugh Smith on Speculative Credit Bubbles and Human Misery Created by Complicity of Corrupt Governments and Central Banks

01 Poverty, 03 Economy, 07 Other Atrocities, 09 Justice, 11 Society, Commerce, Commercial Intelligence, Corruption, Federal Reserve, Government, Idiocy, Law Enforcement, World Bank

300 Million Talons... — 300 Million Talons…

The Immense (and Needless) Human Misery Caused by Speculative Credit Bubbles (August 27, 2013)

Financialization and the Neocolonial Model of credit-based exploitation leave immense human suffering in their wake when speculative credit bubbles inevitably implode.

Discussions of the global financial crisis tend to be bloodless accounts of policy and “growth.” This detachment masks the immense and totally needless human misery created by financial engineering. A correspondent with first-hand knowledge of the situation in Cyprus filed this account:

“RE: the Cyprus economic crisis, the politicians are unbowed by the chaos they caused, still behaving as they have always done, preaching populist platitudes, corrupt as ever, unapologetic. A poll showed that 99% of Cypriots believe their government is corrupt.Yesterday, the former president, Demetris Christofias, appeared before a tribunal investigating the causes of the economic collapse. He tried to force the tribunal to do what he told them, saying, “I am not just any witness, I was the President of the Republic for 5 years”. They told him where to get off and he stormed out.

Little hope for this country. Money leaving. Best talent leaving. Foreign investment in a planned energy hub has been hijacked by the politicians. Cyprus is returning back to what it always was: a tourist destination run by shopkeepers and farmers.Sad days. Most people feel betrayed by the politicians and big powers.”

This report highlights a key dynamic of speculative credit/banking bubbles: they require the complicity of central banks and the state. Speculative bubbles based solely on cash have very short lifespans, as the bubble bursts violently as soon as the gamblers' cash has been sucked into the vortex.

Read full report

2013/08/272013/08/27

Berto Jongman: Accessing Terrorism Literature in the Digital Age Plus 230 Online Sites for Terrorism Research

09 Terrorism, Articles & Chapters

ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH

Perspectives on Terrorism is a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies

Volume 7, Issue 3, pp. 84-98

The Art of Searching: How to Find Terrorism Literature in the Digital Age

Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This guide provides an overview on information retrieval techniques for locating high-quality literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Starting from general considerations on conducting a literature search – taking into account the specifics of terrorism studies – instructions are provided on how to find particular literature types by using different search methods and information retrieval systems, followed by information on how to refine a search by employing focused search strategies. The explanations are enriched with numerous links to recommendable resources. The included examples are focused on terrorism studies, but the general search mechanics can be applied to other research domains as well.

Full Text: PDF HTML

III. Resources

230 Websites and Blogs for Terrorism Research

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Abstract

This resource collection lists 230 websites and blogs which are deemed to be valuable information sources for serious researchers in the field of (counter-) terrorism studies. The first part lists websites run by academic, governmental, non-governmental, and private institutes, organisations, companies, as well as individual experts. The second part of the collection comprises blogs, many of them containing analyses of primary source materials as well as up-to-date news.

Access the Index (Live Links)

2013/08/26

Berto Jongman: Complex Emergencies

Communities of Practice, Officers Call, Policies, Threats, White Papers

This brief reviews the extant literature on complex emergencies (CE); it proposes a revised definition of what constitutes a CE, to include its causes and constituent parts; it provides a framework to distinguish CE’s from other ongoing conflicts; and it provides ways to respond to them.

Download: English (PDF · 8 pages · 1.0 MB)

Author: Léa Macias
Editor: Clionadh Raleigh
Series: CCAPS Briefs
Issue: 16
Publisher: Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) Program, United States

2013/08/26

Berto Jongman: Foreign Policy Exclusive: CIA Files Prove USA Helped Sadaam Hussein Attack Iran with Chemical Weapons

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 05 Iran, 07 Other Atrocities, 08 Proliferation, 08 Wild Cards, Corruption, DoD, Government, Idiocy, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence

Hypocrisy?

Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran

The U.S. knew Hussein was launching some of the worst chemical attacks in history — and still gave him a hand.

The U.S. government may be considering military action in response to chemical strikes near Damascus. But a generation ago, America's military and intelligence communities knew about and did nothing to stop a series of nerve gas attacks far more devastating than anything Syria has seen, Foreign Policy has learned.

Source: https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2003/03/11/15814941.php

In 1988, during the waning days of Iraq's war with Iran, the United States learned through satellite imagery that Iran was about to gain a major strategic advantage by exploiting a hole in Iraqi defenses. U.S. intelligence officials conveyed the location of the Iranian troops to Iraq, fully aware that Hussein's military would attack with chemical weapons, including sarin, a lethal nerve agent.

The intelligence included imagery and maps about Iranian troop movements, as well as the locations of Iranian logistics facilities and details about Iranian air defenses. The Iraqis used mustard gas and sarin prior to four major offensives in early 1988 that relied on U.S. satellite imagery, maps, and other intelligence. These attacks helped to tilt the war in Iraq's favor and bring Iran to the negotiating table, and they ensured that the Reagan administration's long-standing policy of securing an Iraqi victory would succeed. But they were also the last in a series of chemical strikes stretching back several years that the Reagan administration knew about and didn't disclose.

U.S. officials have long denied acquiescing to Iraqi chemical attacks, insisting that Hussein's government never announced he was going to use the weapons. But retired Air Force Col. Rick Francona, who was a military attaché in Baghdad during the 1988 strikes, paints a different picture.

“The Iraqis never told us that they intended to use nerve gas. They didn't have to. We already knew,” he told Foreign Policy.

Read full article (four screens, more links).

2013/08/252013/08/25

General and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry on the Persistent Failure of US Understanding in Afghanistan

02 Diplomacy, 03 Economy, 08 Wild Cards, 09 Justice, 10 Security, 11 Society, Corruption, Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, Government, Idiocy, Ineptitude, IO Deeds of War, Lessons, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence

使用谷歌翻译在下一列的顶部。

गूगल अगले स्तंभ के शीर्ष पर अनुवाद का प्रयोग करें.

Google sonraki sütunun üstünde Çevir kullanın.

Используйте Google Translate на вершине соседней колонке.

گوگل اگلے کالم میں سب سے اوپر ترجمہ کا استعمال کریں.

Emphasis below added by Milt Bearden, former CIA chief in Pakistan also responsible for the field aspects of the CIA's covert support against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Foreign Affairs, September/October 2013

ESSAY

The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan
The Other Side of the COIN

Karl W. Eikenberry

Eikenberry, Obama, and General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan, March 2010. (Pete Souza / White House)

KARL W. EIKENBERRY is William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He served as Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011.

Since 9/11, two consecutive U.S. administrations have labored mightily to help Afghanistan create a state inhospitable to terrorist organizations with transnational aspirations and capabilities. The goal has been clear enough, but its attainment has proved vexing. Officials have struggled to define the necessary attributes of a stable post-Taliban Afghan state and to agree on the best means for achieving them. This is not surprising. The U.S. intervention required improvisation in a distant, mountainous land with de jure, but not de facto, sovereignty; a traumatized and divided population; and staggering political, economic, and social problems. Achieving even minimal strategic objectives in such a context was never going to be quick, easy, or cheap.

Of the various strategies that the United States has employed in Afghanistan over the past dozen years, the 2009 troop surge was by far the most ambitious and expensive. Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was at the heart of the Afghan surge. Rediscovered by the U.S. military during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency was updated and codified in 2006 in Field Manual 3-24, jointly published by the U.S. Army and the Marines. The revised
doctrine placed high confidence in the infallibility of military leadership at all levels of engagement (from privates to generals) with the indigenous population throughout the conflict zone. Military doctrine provides guidelines that inform how armed forces contribute to campaigns, operations, and battles. Contingent on context, military doctrine is
meant to be suggestive, not prescriptive.

Broadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation government able to deliver essential human services. Field Manual 3-24 also makes clear the extensive length and expense of COIN campaigns: “Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources.”

Continue reading “General and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry on the Persistent Failure of US Understanding in Afghanistan”