Reference: Gorgon Stare–USAF Goes Nuts (Again)

04 Inter-State Conflict, 05 Civil War, 08 Wild Cards, 10 Security, Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Augmented Reality, Budgets & Funding, Geospatial, info-graphics/data-visualization, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), Maps, Methods & Process, Military, Misinformation & Propaganda, Officers Call, Policy, Politics of Science & Science of Politics, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests, Reform, Secrecy & Politics of Secrecy, Standards, Strategy, Technologies, Waste (materials, food, etc)
Chuck Spinney Sounds Off

SEE ALSO: Journal: Gorgon Stare (All Eyes, No Brain)

The American Way of War: If You Can See Everything, Can You Know Anything?

With Air Force's new drone, ‘we can see everything,' in today's Washington Post (attached below) is a good example of how the high-cost addiction to techno war is  running amok. One thing ought to be clear in Afghanistan: A tiny adversary armed with the most primitive weapons, and a command and control system made up of prayer rugs and cell phones, has brought the high tech US military to a stalemate … or even worse, the looming specter a grand-strategic defeat, because we are becoming economically and morally exhausted by the futility of this war.  It does not matter whether it is President Obama presiding over a vapid strategic review or a low ranking grunt on point in Afghanistan — the central problem facing the United States in Afghanistan is the absence of what the Germans call fingerspitzengefühlor the feeling in the fingerprints needed for an intuitive feel for or connection with one's environment.

As the American strategist Colonel John Boyd (USAF Ret.) showed, fingerspitzengefühl is absolutely essential to the kind of synthetic (as opposed to analytic) thinking that is necessary for quick, relevant, and ultimately successful decision making in war, where quick decisions and sharp actions at all levels must be made and harmonized in an ever-present  atmosphere of menace, uncertainty, mistrust, fear, and chaos that impedes decisive action.[1]

Article About Grogon Stare

To paraphrase Clausewitz, these difficulties multiply to produce a kind of friction, and therefore, even though everything in war is simple, the simplest thing is difficult.  Clausewitz considered friction is the atmosphere of war. Nevertheless, according to the Post, the Air Force is about to deploy to Afghanistan a “revolutionary airborne surveillance system called Gorgon Stare, which will be able to transmit live video images of physical movement across an entire town.”

Quoting Maj. Gen. James O. Poss, the Air Force's assistant deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, “Gorgon Stare will be looking at a whole city, so there will be no way for the adversary to know what we're looking at, and we can see everything.”  Nirvana. While the Post dutifully reports a smattering of opposing views, it misses the ramifications of the central idea epitomized by General Poss's confident assertion: namely, how the American ideology of techno war assumes it can negate the human need for fingerspitzengefühl on a battlefield.

General Poss's confidence suggests quite clearly he believes seeing everything enables one to know everything. This a stunning theory of knowledge.  It is also a classic example of the American military's unquestioned belief that complex technologies coupled to step-by-step analytical procedures can negate the friction of combat to solve any problem in war.  Lifting the fog of war is, in fact, a phrase frequently used in contractor brochures touting the efficacy of these technologies.  This reflects theory of knowledge — really an unquestioned ideology — that views war as fundamentally a procedural problem of methodical analytical thinking, as opposed to its messy reality of being in large part an art of synthetic thinking.

Continue reading “Reference: Gorgon Stare–USAF Goes Nuts (Again)”

Worth a Look: First Earth Battalion YouTube

Advanced Cyber/IO, Augmented Reality, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, InfoOps (IO), Methods & Process, Movies, Officers Call, Strategy, Videos/Movies/Documentaries, YouTube

YouTube: Jim Channon ” Old World Order” ?…Just walk away…!

YouTube: Jim channon On 2012 and the future part1

YouTube: One Minute Shift – Are You Ready?

YouTube: “Operation Noble Steward” by Lt. Colonel Jim Channon

YouTube: Combat of the Collective Conscience

YouTube: GOATS DECLASSIFIED: The True Story Behind The Men Who Stare At Goats

Tip of the Hat to Sumner Carter at Facebook.

See Also:

Review (DVD): The Men Who Stare at Goats (2009)

Journal: How to Kill Innovation & Ingenuity

Advanced Cyber/IO, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, Methods & Process
Seth Godin Home

That's not the way we do things about here

Please don't underestimate how powerful this sentence is.

When you say this to a colleague, a new hire, a student or a freelancer, you've established a powerful norm, one that they will be hesitant to challenge.

This might be exactly what you were hoping for, but if your goal is to encourage innovation, you blew it.

Phi Beta Iota: In strategic and force structure studies (neither strategic nor studies) the code is “protect the shooters” when they really mean protect shooter command billets, never mind the shooters themselves or the desperate need for a 10% move from shooters to thinkers.

See Also:

Graphic: Principles of War versus Principles of Peace

Graphic: Digital Learners versus Analog Teachers

Reference: 27 Sep MajGen Robert Scales, USA (Ret), PhD

Reference: Saving Defense from Itself

Review: The Power of Unreasonable People–How Social Entrepreneurs Create Markets That Change the World

Review: The Ingenuity Gap–Facing the Economic, Environmental, and Other Challenges of an Increasingly Complex and Unpredictable Future

Journal: Imperial by Design, Unethical by Choice

02 Diplomacy, 10 Security, 11 Society, Corruption, Cultural Intelligence, Government, Methods & Process, Misinformation & Propaganda, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests, Secrecy & Politics of Secrecy, Strategy, Threats
Who, Me?

Imperial by Design

The National Interest

From the issue

John J. Mearsheimer

December 16, 2010

Summary: The author discusses the intellectual but not the ethical underpinings of the failure of US foreign policy and national security since the first Clinton Administration.  He touches on alternative policies such as isolationalism, offshore balancing, selective engagement, global dominance, and then settles on offshore balancing as the way to go: pulling back the Army and Marines from overseas, sharply reducing their budgets, and restoring budget to the Air Force and the Navy.

Read the article….

John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interest, and his most recent book, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics, was published in January 2011 by Oxford University Press.  He is also the co-author of the deeply practical The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy and The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Who’s Who in Peace Intelligence: Douglas A. Macgregor

10 Security, 11 Society, Advanced Cyber/IO, Alpha M-P, Analysis, Budgets & Funding, Ethics, Historic Contributions, InfoOps (IO), Methods & Process, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence, Peace Intelligence, Reform, Strategy, Threats
Douglas A. Macgregor
Top Web Hits

Wikipedia Biography with Many Links

The Macgregor Briefings: An Information Age Vision for the U.S. Army

NOTE 1:  HTML versions work, PPT do not

NOTE 2:  Cyber/IO is the enabler of all that he envisions.

Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (2009)

Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (2004)

Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (1997)

Journal: DNI Sand-Bagged by Triad & Self

Advanced Cyber/IO, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), Key Players, Methods & Process, Officers Call, Policies, Real Time, Reform, Strategy, Threats
Mario Profaca Recommends...

DNI Clapper Needs to Know

The Weekly Standard, DEC 29, 2010

In fact, the more we learn about what the plotters were up to, as well as the efforts to stop them, the more troubling the DNI’s ignorance becomes.

Three facts, in particular, have emerged that make this lapse inexcusable.

First, the State Department says the plotters had the U.S. embassy in London in their sites. On Monday, a Foggy Bottom spokesman confirmed that the embassy was on the plotters’ “targeting list.”

Second, according to the Guardian (UK), the alleged would-be terrorists were arrested “after several months of surveillance and monitoring by police and MI5 officers.”

Third, the UK press has reported that the plotters were, at the very least, inspired by the notorious al Qaeda cleric Anwar al Awlaki. … Awlaki is currently one of the most wanted terrorists in the world.

Read complete article….

Phi Beta Iota: The DNI has been sand-bagged by three people and himself.  Neither John Brennan (kitchen DNI at the White House), Leon Panetta (cheerleader for the CIA), or Michael E. Leiter (lawyer fronting the National Counterterrorism Center) appear to have any direct interest in seeing Jim Clapper succeed.  Unfortunately, Jim Clapper has also sand-bagged himself by accepting “business as usual” and contenting himself with improvements on the margins–doing the wrong things righter.  There is not a single piece of the US secret world that is working the way it should, in part because the entire mess lacks the legitimacy derived from relevance, and in part because the one thing Jim Clapper could have done on his own authority–the creation of an Open Source Center and an embedded Multinational Decision Support Centre–he has not done.   Since the obvious needs to be spelled out, here are the two reasons why the OSC/MDSC are essential: 1) to begin providing the 96% of the decision-support not now provided to everyone including the President but explicitly not provided by classified to anyone below the President including policy, acquisition, and operations action officers; and b) to create the baseline for evaluating the Return on Investment (RoI) for the mis-begotten pieces of the secret world that are not, by any stretch of the imagination, worth the $90 billion a year they are costing us now.  If there were one person among the seniors actually capable of making a difference, it should have been Jim Clapper.  Happy New Year…

See Also:

2010: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Trilogy Updated

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

Building a Constituency for the Director of National Intelligence

Advanced Cyber/IO, Analysis, Augmented Reality, Budgets & Funding, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, info-graphics/data-visualization, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), Key Players, Methods & Process, Open Government, Policies, Reform, Strategy, Threats

Richard Wright

Decision-support (intelligence) is the ultimate objective of information processes. One must carefully distinguish between data which is raw text, signal, or image; information which is collated data of generic interest; and intelligence which is information tailored to support a specific decision…

Robert David Steele Vivas  On Intelligence (AFCEA, 2000)

As noted in an earlier Journal entry (Assessment of the Position of Director of National Intelligence December 27 2010), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is an unclaimed orphan among the senior U.S. intelligence managers while the Office of DNI (ODNI) is an unwelcome member of the so-called Intelligence Community (IC).  The current DNI, General James Clapper (USAF ret.) is a good man in a bad job. He conspicuously does not have the ear of his most important constituent, the President of the U.S. (POTUS) or the support of the President’s most important intelligence advisor John Brennan.  So how can the DNI carve out a niche for himself and his office that will enable him to build a Washington D.C. based constituency that may even include the POTUS ?

Even a cursory examination of the principal agencies of the IC, will reveal that none of them are producing strategic intelligence. CIA maintains that its intelligence analysts (most less than five years in service) are too pressed by the need to develop current intelligence to engage in the in depth analysis and research required to produce strategic intelligence. State INR the only other intelligence center really capable of producing strategic intelligence tells much the same story.  The once widely influential National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), primary vehicles for strategic intelligence, are no longer highly regarded guides to policy formulation.

Yet according to one of the most important thinkers on intelligence analysis, Sherman Kent, strategic intelligence provides, “the knowledge which our highly placed civilians and military men must have to guard the national welfare” (emphasis added). Put another way, strategic intelligence can be described as accurate and comprehensive information that is needed by decision makers to formulate policies or take actions to protect our national interests.

Continue reading “Building a Constituency for the Director of National Intelligence”