This post has four parts: 1) Chuck Spinney's long commentary; 2) The original article with attachments from TruthDig; 3) a ripost making three points about Chuck's comments; 4) Chuck's answer and a short comment from Robert Steele

The Eikenberry Cables Turn Sun Tzu on His Head: Domestic Politics and the Art of Asymmetrical Bureaucratic War

In the opening line of Book 1 of Sun Tzu's classic, The Art of War (circa 400 BC), the first treatise ever written on the subject, the Chinese master said,”War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life and death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.” [1] He then goes on to describe a systematic method for assembling the information needed to make a rational decision to go to war. Today, in Pentagonese, we would call his method a “net assessment,” that is to say Sun Tzu described a very thoughtful way to perform a comparative analysis of one's own strengths and weaknesses with those of the adversary.

Sun Tzu's strategic outlook is amazingly relevant to contemporary circumstances; indeed, it is timeless, and I submit it provides the gold standard for for evaluating our own efforts to grapple with the question of going to war or to escalate a war — basically, his advice was simple: know your enemy and know yourself before plunging into war.

Continue reading “Journal: Afghanistan, Sun Tzu, State, & “Intelligence””

2010/01/282010/01/28

Journal: Vietnam and Laos and Afghanistan

Intelligence (Government/Secret), Military, Strategy

One Tribe at a Time

Can the U.S. military devise a successful strategy to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan? It already has the outline of a potentially successful strategy, just read Major Jim Gant’s “One Tribe at a Time (A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan)”, previously posted here, Reference: One Tribe at a Time by Maj Jim Gant along with Reference: One Tribe at a Time by Steven Pressfield.

The details of how to implement a tribal strategy and work with the Afghan tribes are unique to that country, but the overall strategy of working with tribes is not new at all.

Where has it been done? Maj. Gant mentions what Army Special Forces did with the mountain tribes of Vietnam (known by the French term “montagnards”). Another even more appropriate example is what the CIA’s Bill Lair did with the Hmong of northern Laos and what other CIA officers did with the Ta’oi and other Lao Theung tribes of southern Laos.

There were no American fighting units in Laos at all. The only American military assigned to Laos were the handful of U.S. Air Force forward air controllers, known as Ravens, but they coordinated a very powerful force multiplier, the close air support of Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft assigned to work for Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The tribal strategy in northern Laos was a very few CIA officers working with entirely Lao tribal surrogates. These tribal surrogates fought on our side and helped implement the strategy of keeping the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) occupied in Laos and away from South Vietnam. They also defended the ancient invasion corridor leading from Hanoi to the Lao capital and on into Thailand.

Continue reading “Journal: Vietnam and Laos and Afghanistan”

2010/01/282010/01/28

Reference: Transforming How We Hire Analysts

Analysis, Ethics, Government, Methods & Process, Military, Reform, Strategy

This is a righteous piece of work out of the National Defense University (NDU) by Mr. Adrian (Zeke) Wolfberg of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), entitled “To Transform into a More Capable Intelligence Community: A Paradigm Shift in the Analyst Selection Strategy.” Published April 21, 2003, this is still valid and of course still ignored.

Continue reading “Reference: Transforming How We Hire Analysts”

2010/01/272010/01/28

Journal: The Greening of the Pentagon’s Strategy

Strategy

aa military sun farm — Military Sun Farm

Climate change may be an “accelerant of instability” in future conflicts, and the U.S. military needs to plan for possible environmental catastrophes and resource wars, according to the Pentagon’s soon-to-be-released master strategy document.

Among other things, the draft QDR suggests the military will have to start planning for operations in which rising sea levels, an ice-free Arctic and higher overall global temperatures may be an important factor. What’s more, it suggests that military planners will have to prepared for the knock-on effects of climate change: forced migration, resource scarcity and the spread of disease.

In parallel, the draft QDR calls for a bigger push for energy independence by the military. The Defense Department, the document notes, is already “moving out smartly” to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, and to tap more renewable sources of energy.

It also points to the clout of one D.C. think tank, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The think tank — which has pioneered the field of “natural security” — just released a new study on how the Pentagon has incorporated climate change and its effects into the process of drafting the QDR.

Continue reading “Journal: The Greening of the Pentagon’s Strategy”

2010/01/272010/01/27

Event: 16-18 July 2010 NYC NY The Next Hope

Collective Intelligence, Communities of Practice, Computer/online security, Cultural Intelligence, Ethics, Geospatial, InfoOps (IO), Key Players, Methods & Process, Mobile, Policies, Real Time, Strategy, Technologies, Threats, Tools

HACKERS ON PLANET EARTH (HOPE)

The Next Hope (2010)

Pre-Registration Now Open

Call for Speakers

Links to Past HOPE Events

Phi Beta Iota: Hackers are like astronauts, pushing the bleeding edge of the envelope. If the US Government had listened to us in 1991-1994, cyberspace would be secure today, and we would not be spending $12 billion a year on the cyber-scam game–outsourcing to beltway bandits fighting for the 100 folks that actually know how to do this stuff and can qualify for clearances. Our solution for the regional networks is gong to be multinational and open everything. This event is specifically recommended for young teens who show signs of intelligence and curiosity, and for mid-career officers beginning to realize that 80% of what they do is without merit, seeking a better way. This is where we do the right things righter, not the wrong things righter.

Photo Gallery (Yahoo) Photo Gallery (Google)

2010/01/262010/01/26

Journal: White House Nightmare, Insanity, or Ignorance?

Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, Key Players, Methods & Process, Policies, Policy, Reform, Strategy, Threats

White House nightmare persists

At the end of Barack Obama’s worst week since taking power a year ago, the US president’s fortunes look set only to deteriorate over the coming days.

Phi Beta Iota: We find it quite remarkable that there is absolutely no “intelligence” in the sense of decision-support anywhere in this story. The last two Administrations (Bush-Cheney and now Obama-Biden) have been noteworthy for the completely absence of strategy, intelligence, Whole of Government management, balanced budget–just about everything a public has a right to expect from its elected and appointed and paid government.

Nightmare is the wrong word–this is self-imposed insanity based on willful ignorance and the absence of a national Open Source Agency (OSA) with a degree of independence equal to that of the Judiciary. In the Age of Information, information itself has become the Fourth Estate, and the Administration either needs to get a grip on reality and start governing with informed maturity, or watch as others pass them by–Brazil, China, India, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, for example.

Search: smart nation intelligence reform electoral reform national security reform

2010/01/212010/01/21

Journal: Intelligence & Innovation Support to Strategy, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, & Acquisition

Analysis, Budgets & Funding, Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Ethics, Geospatial, History, InfoOps (IO), Information Operations (IO), Key Players, Methods & Process, Mobile, Policies, Policy, Real Time, Reform, Strategy, Technologies, Threats, Tools, True Cost

Steele Best Available Photo — Robert David STEELE Vivas

Chuck Spinney is still the best “real” engineer in this town–almost everyone else is staggering after fifty years of government-specification cost-plus engineering. Also, as Chuck explores in the piece on Complexity to Avoid Accountability is Expensive we in the “requirements” business are as much to blame–Service connivance with complexity has killed acquisition from both a financial inputs and a war-fighting relevance outcome point of view. The Services have forgotten the basics of requirements definition and multi-mission interoperability and supportability.

The Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC) was created by General Al Gray, USMC (Ret), then Commandant of the Marine Corps, for three reasons:

1. Intelligence support to constabulary and expeditionary operations from the three major services was abysmal to non-existent.

2. Intelligence support to the Service level planners and programmers striving to interact with other Services, the Unified Commands, and the Joint Staff was non-existent–this was the case with respect to policy, acquisition, and operations. The cluster-feel over Haiti and the total inadequacy of our 24-48 hour response tells us nothing has changed, in part because we still cannot do a “come as you are” joint inter-agency anything.

Continue reading “Journal: Intelligence & Innovation Support to Strategy, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, & Acquisition”