Reference: Open Source Agency (OSA) I

About the Idea, Articles & Chapters, Briefings (Core), Director of National Intelligence et al (IC), DoD, Legislation, Memoranda

The Open Source Agency (OSA) was first proposed by Robert Steele to the Open Source Council in 1992, as an Open Source  Center outside the wire.  The rationale was that best in class sources would change constantly, and access was needed to all information in all languages all the time.  CIA and MITRE conspired to substitute instead the Open Source Information System (OSIS), a still-anemic unproductive system with limited sources and no analytic tool-kit worthy of the name.

On this history, see:

Journal: LEXIS-NEXIS OSINT Kiss to CIA/OSC

History of Opposition (15)

Despite the history of opposition, and the fact that the CIA’s Open Source Center (OSC) today only deals with eleven countries on a more or less regular basis, while going through the motions with others, a robust multinational network has been developed over time that includes at least 90 countries, some of which have made gains in harnessing the eight tribes of intelligence, some not.  The Nordics, and especially Sweden, have been especially effective, at furthering the concept of M4IS2 (multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain information-sharing and sense-making).

On this progress, see:

Historic Contributions (246)

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

There remains a need for an Open Source Agency (OSA) that is under diplomatic auspices as suggested by Dr. Joe Markowitz and endorsed by Congressman Rob Simmons (R-CT-02) and Robert Steele, both writing and speaking on this over the years.  Below are some references that bear directly on the need for and the means by which an OSA might be created.

2010: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Trilogy Updated

2010 INTELLIGENCE FOR EARTH: Clarity, Diversity, Integrity, & Sustainability

Legislation: Smart Nation-Safe Nation Act of 2009

Memoranda: OSS CEO to DNI One-Pager

Memorandum: $2 Billion Obligation Plan Centered on Defense, for a New Open Source Agency

Memoranda: Creating a New Agency with a New Mission, New Methods, and a New Mind Set

Memoranda: Policy-Budget Outreach Tool

2006 INFORMATION OPERATIONS: All Information, All Languages, All the Time

2006 THE SMART NATION ACT: Public Intelligence in the Public Interest

2006 Forbes Blank Slate On Intelligence

2002 THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: Personal, Public, & Political

1995 GIQ 13/2 Creating a Smart Nation: Strategy, Policy, Intelligence, and Information

1995 National Information Strategy 101 Presentation to CENDI/COSPO*

Assisi-Rome 2nd Meeting

Book Lists, Memoranda

The first meeting, in Assisi on Saturday 22 January 2011, was off the record.  The letter is in the Franciscan Order’s hands.  The third meeting, with a major trans-Europe foundation, is off the record until the Secretary-General obtains approval to proceed with broad dissemination of the letter.

The second meeting, arranged by Sergio Germani, was by invitation and spanned the various sectors with an emphasis on the government ministries contemplating the need for an Italian national security strategy.  This was the only meeting that covered anything other than the letter to the Most Holy Father.

Below are a few of the topics addressed and links that were recommended as part of the Q&A.  At the very end are other Assisi Intelligence links.  The short URL to the original link is http://www.tinyurl.com/Assisi-Intelligence.

Summary of topics (repeated with links below)

Letter to the Pope (First Order of Business)
9-11 (The Last Question)
21st Century Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
21st Century Information Security
21st Century Regional Intelligence
21st Century Security
21st Century Strategy (Italy, Europe, World)
Coping with Non-State CNBC/WMD
Emerging Threats: Identification and Response
Future of US Africa Command
Open Source Intelligence (US Status & Failure)
Terrorism Today and Tomorrow

Continue reading “Assisi-Rome 2nd Meeting”

Reference: Intelligence for the Spirit of Assisi

Advanced Cyber/IO, Budgets & Funding, Collective Intelligence, Collective Intelligence, Commercial Intelligence, Communities of Practice, Counter-Oppression/Counter-Dictatorship Practices, Cultural Intelligence, Earth Intelligence, Ethics, Geospatial, Gift Intelligence, History, info-graphics/data-visualization, InfoOps (IO), International Aid, Journalism/Free-Press/Censorship, Key Players, Memoranda, Methods & Process, Mobile, Open Government, Peace Intelligence, Policies, Policy, Politics of Science & Science of Politics, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests, Real Time, Reform, Research resources, Secrecy & Politics of Secrecy, Standards, Strategy, Technologies, Threats, Tools, True Cost, Waste (materials, food, etc)
Click on Image to Enlarge

Letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI

Steele Book Profile

Resume Robert David STEELE Vivas M4IS2

See Also:

28 Jan Seven Answers–Robert Steele in Rome

27 Jan Assisi-Rome 2nd Meeting

27 Jan Reference: Correspondence on Assisi Intelligence

16 Jan Event: 26 Oct 2011 Assisi Italy Pope, Peace, & Prayer — 5th Inter-Faith Event Since 1986 — Terms of Reference…

Worth a Look: Book Review Lists (Positive)

Worth a Look: Book Review Lists (Negative)

Reference: Electoral Reform–1 Page 9 Points 2.2

Blog Wisdom, Memoranda, White Papers
Electoral Reform 2.2

UPDATED 8 Nov 2011 to bury.  This is the original that everyone ignored, now that Electoral Reform Act of 2012 has gone viral courtesy of Reddit and YouTube, the updated versions of the proposed Statement of Demand and the Electoral Reform Act of 2012 can be found at http://tinyurl.com/OWS-ER-HO.

UPDATED 29 May 2011 to add top-level link:

Seven Promises to America–Who Will Do This?

Electoral Reform is the “fast track” toward restoring the Constitution and the Republic (We the People must be sovereign or it is not a Republic).  As long as the Executive and Congress are led by unethical politicians working for unethical corporations, public intelligence can and should be used to expose each individual, each transaction, each transgression.  That is the “slow road.”  However, if the Independents, Greens, Reforms, and the honest Libertarians (not faux Libertarians like the Koch Brothers) can get together on this ONE THING, the “fast track” is possible in time for 2012.

Full text of one pager below the line.

Continue reading “Reference: Electoral Reform–1 Page 9 Points 2.2”

Reference: Panetta Puts Lipstick on the Pig (Again)

Government, Memoranda
No Change Needed....

Message from the Director: Lessons from Khowst

Last December, our Agency family lost seven courageous and talented colleagues in a terrorist attack at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khowst, Afghanistan. These dedicated men and women were assigned to CIA’s top priority—disrupting and dismantling al-Qa’ida and its militant allies. That work carries, by its very nature, significant risk. CIA is conducting the most aggressive counterterrorism operations in our history, a mission we are pursuing with a level of determination worthy of our fallen heroes. We will sustain that momentum and, whenever possible, intensify our pursuit. We will continue to fight for a safer America.

Earlier this year, I directed that a task force of seasoned Agency professionals conduct a review of the Khowst attack. The purpose was to examine what happened, what lessons were learned, and what steps should be taken to prevent such incidents in the future. In addition, I asked Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Charlie Allen, a highly accomplished former Agency officer, to conduct an independent study of the Khowst attack and to review the work of the task force. They concurred with its findings. One of CIA’s greatest strengths is our ability to learn from experience, refine our methods, and adapt to the shifting tactics of America’s enemies.

The review is now complete, and I would like to thank those who participated. They did our Agency a great service. It was, to be sure, a difficult task—especially since key insights perished with those we lost. Perfect visibility into all that contributed to the attack is therefore impossible. But based on an exhaustive examination of the available information, we have a firm understanding of what our Agency could have done better. In keeping with past practice, we will provide the Khowst report to the Office of Inspector General.

In highly sensitive, complex counterterrorism operations, our officers must often deal with dangerous people in situations involving a high degree of ambiguity and risk. The task force noted that the Khowst assailant fit the description of someone who could offer us access to some of our most vicious enemies. He had already provided information that was independently verified. The decision to meet him at the Khowst base—with the objective of gaining additional intelligence on high priority terrorist targets—was the product of consultations between Headquarters and the field. He had confirmed access within extremist circles, making a covert relationship with him—if he was acting in good faith—potentially very productive. But he had not rejected his terrorist roots. He was, in fact, a brutal murderer.

Mitigating the risk inherent in intelligence operations, especially the most sensitive ones, is essential to success. In this case, the task force determined that the Khowst assailant was not fully vetted and that sufficient security precautions were not taken. These missteps occurred because of shortcomings across several Agency components in areas including communications, documentation, and management oversight. Coupled with a powerful drive to disrupt al-Qa’ida, these factors contributed to the tragedy at Khowst. Each played an important role; none was more important than the others. Based on the findings of the task force and the independent review, responsibility cannot be assigned to any particular individual or group. Rather, it was the intense determination to accomplish the mission that influenced the judgments that were made.

There are no guarantees in the dangerous work of counterterrorism, but the task force identified six key areas that deserve greater focus as we carry out that vital mission. We will:

  • Enforce greater discipline in communications, ensuring that key guidance, operational facts, and judgments are conveyed and clearly flagged in formal channels.
  • Strengthen our attention to counterintelligence concerns while maintaining a wartime footing.
  • Apply the skills and experience of senior officers more effectively in sensitive cases.
  • Require greater standardization of security procedures.
  • More carefully manage information sharing with other intelligence services.
  • Maintain our high operational tempo against terrorist targets, even as we make adjustments to how we conduct our essential mission.

I have approved 23 specific actions recommended by the task force, some of which I ordered implemented months ago. They provide for organizational and resource changes, communications improvements, tightened security procedures, more focused training, and reinforced counterintelligence practices. These include:

  • Establishing a War Zone Board made up of senior officers from several components and chaired by the Director of the National Clandestine Service. It will conduct a baseline review of our staffing, training, security, and resources in the most dangerous areas where we operate.
  • Assembling a select surge cadre of veteran officers who will lend their expertise to our most critical counterterrorism operations.
  • Creating an NCS Deputy within the Counterterrorism Center, who will report to the Director of the Counterterrorism Center and ensure a more integrated effort across Agency offices.
  • Conducting a thorough review of our security measures and applying even more rigorous standards at all our facilities.
  • Expanding our training effort for both managers and officers on hostile environments and counterintelligence challenges.
  • Creating an integrated counterintelligence vetting cell within our Counterterrorism Center that focuses on high-risk/high-gain assets, evaluates potential threats, assesses “lessons learned,” and applies the latest technology and best practices to counterterrorism operations.
  • Designating a senior officer to ensure that all the recommendations are indeed implemented.

We’ve now taken a hard look at what happened and what needed to be done after the tragedy at Khowst. While we cannot eliminate all of the risks involved in fighting a war, we can and will do a better job of protecting our officers. Drawing on the work of the task force and its insights, it’s time to move forward. Nothing in the report can relieve the pain of losing our seven fallen colleagues. By putting their lives on the line to pursue our nation’s terrorist enemies, they taught us what bravery is all about. It is that legacy that we will always remember in our hearts.

Leon E. Panetta

Posted: Oct 19, 2010 06:30 PM
Last Updated: Oct 19, 2010 06:30 PM
Last Reviewed: Oct 19, 2010 06:30 PM

Phi Beta Iota: Can’t fix stupid.

See also:

Journal: CIA Officer Blew Off Warning in Jordon Weeks in Advance of Jordanian Suicide Bombing in Afghanistan that Killed Seven

Journal: The Truth on Khost Kathy

Journal: CIA Leads the “Walking Dead” in USA (With RECAP Links)

Reference: Fixing Intel–A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan

Reference: Retired CIA officer–Fix the Agency

Review: Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA

Review: The Human Factor–Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture

Worth a Look: Book Reviews on Intelligence (Lack Of)