Journal: CIA WikiLeaks Task Force (aka WTF, One Down From REMF)

07 Other Atrocities, Computer/online security, Cultural Intelligence, Government, InfoOps (IO), IO Sense-Making, IO Technologies, Officers Call, Policies
Marcus Aurelius Recommends

washingtonpost.com

CIA launches task force to assess impact of U.S. cables' exposure by WikiLeaks

By Greg Miller Wednesday, December 22, 2010; 12:24 AM

The CIA has launched a task force to assess the impact of the exposure of thousands of U.S. diplomatic cables and military files by WikiLeaks.

Officially, the panel is called the WikiLeaks Task Force. But at CIA headquarters, it's mainly known by its all-too-apt acronym: W.T.F.

The irreverence is perhaps understandable for an agency that has been relatively unscathed by WikiLeaks. Only a handful of CIA files have surfaced on the WikiLeaks Web site, and records from other agencies posted online reveal remarkably little about CIA employees or operations.

Read full article….

Very cool map and other graphics

Phi Beta Iota: We understand that CIA used to handle Department of State Embassy traffic, and the ugly little fact associated with WikiLeaks, that the Department of Defense is now handling Department of State traffic, has been buried.  The DoD “Grid” is hosed and is never going to be fixed absent a a clean sheet break from the legacy and the contractors.  GAO is interested in doing an update to its first two damning indictments of DoD's Swiss Cheese Communications environment, it just needs one Member of Congress to ask for it….

Afterthought: CIA had a chance in 1986, under Bill Donnelly (DDA), Ken Weslick (C/DO/IMS), and Robert Steele (PM Project George (Smiley)), in combination with the superb work of Gordon Oehler, Dennis McCormick, and Diane Webb in in DI/OSWR, to get  it right.  They were specifically told at the highest levels that they needed to do two things: change the paradigm from “once in, everything visible” to “need to know tracking and accountablity,” and implement the “reverse hit” strategy that disclosed need to know hits to the owner of the clandestine or covert information rather than the seeker.  With Bill Casey's death CIA lost whatever chance it had of entering the 21st Century moderately coherent.  We have wasted close to a quarter century because DoD had a death drip on ADA and refused to contemplate object-oriented programming or open source software for decades beyond ADA's natural death, and OMB gave up the concept of inter-agency interoperability and secure information-sharing in the 1980's.  At the same time, the National Information Infrastructure was all theater and no security.  Marty Harris meant well, but he simply would not focus on fundamentals such as code-level security, education, and strict classification limitations.

See Also:

2009 Defense Science Board Report on Creating an Assured Joint DoD and Interagency Interoperable Net-Centric Enterprise

2006 General Accountability Office (GAO) Defense Acquisitions DoD Management Approach and Processes Not Well-Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid

2004 General Accountability Office (GAO) Report: Defense Acquisitiions: The Global Information Grid and Challenges Facing Its Implementation

Journal: Pentagon Flails in Defending Cyberspace

Journal: Army Industrial-Era Network Security + Cyber-Security RECAP (Links to Past Posts)

Reference: Logistics Oversight as an Information Operations (IO) Mission

Articles & Chapters, Computer/online security, Cultural Intelligence, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), IO Multinational, IO Sense-Making, Methods & Process, Military, Officers Call, Peace Intelligence, Power Behind-the-Scenes/Special Interests, Secrecy & Politics of Secrecy, Strategy, Threats

David IsenbergDavid Isenberg

Posted: December 21, 2010 11:59 PM

Huffington Post

Can't Anyone at DoD Do Oversight? Anyone at All?

The perennial issue regarding private military security contractors is the degree to which they are subject to effective oversight. In that regard there is only one item in today's news worth looking at. That is the report issued by the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, chaired by John F. Tierney (D-MA). The Majority staff report is titled, Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defense's Fuel Contracts in Kyrgyzstan. The report culminates an eight-month investigation into the Department of Defense's multi-billion dollar aviation fuel contracts at the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan.

Reminding one of the famous line by 1st Lieutenant Milo Minderbinder in Joseph Heller's famous Catch-22 novel, “We're gonna come out of this war rich!” the report found that to keep U.S. warplanes flying over Afghanistan, the Pentagon allowed a “secrecy obsessed” business group to supply jet fuel to a U.S. air base in Kyrgyzstan, turning a blind eye to an elaborate fraud involving fuel deliveries from Russia.

. . . . . . .

But the fuel was being bought by the Pentagon for shipment to the American airbase in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, and from there on to Afghanistan, the report said. Once Russian officials discovered the true identity of the recipient, they cut off supplies, creating a major logistical headache for United States military commanders.

That breakdown forced a major redrawing of supply routes into Afghanistan for jet fuel, which is in chronically short supply in landlocked Afghanistan. It also touched off a major behind-the-scenes diplomatic effort by the Obama administration to rebuild the fuel lines.

Read the complete very well-presented and documented article….

Phi Beta Iota: David Isenberg, author of Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq, has become a valuable oversight contributor with respect to the out-of-control acquisition system on top of the out-of-control Private Military Contractor (PMC) system.  When reliability and redundancy matter, any military force that does not understand its supply chain timelines, costs, and geospatial realities down to the RFID level, as well as the vulnerabilities to disruption, is begging for a major hit.  The Information Operations (IO) domain appears poised for a major advance, integrating intelligence, logistics, operations, and civil affairs information in a manner never before attempted–with the supplemental value of placing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in proper relationship to Cyber-Security, i.e. 70-30 or thereabouts (some would say 80-20).  Make this multinational, and it will be a game changer.  This is one reason the Office of the Inspector-General is one of the fifteen slices of HUMINT that must be managed by IO.

See Also:

Continue reading “Reference: Logistics Oversight as an Information Operations (IO) Mission”

2011 Top 10 Cyber Predictions (and Then Some)

Collaboration Zones, Communities of Practice, Computer/online security, Cyberscams, malware, spam, InfoOps (IO), IO Multinational, IO Sense-Making, IO Technologies, Key Players, Methods & Process, Mobile, Officers Call, Policies, Real Time, Secrecy & Politics of Secrecy, Standards, Strategy, Technologies, Threats

2011 Top 10 Cyber Predictions

Posted by Anup Ghosh on December 16, 2010

Everybody is putting out their Top 10 lists of predictions for 2011. Not to be left out of the party, below is a list of what we expect to see in 2011 in Cyber Security.

1.  Malware.

2.  Blame the User.

3.  Reactive approaches to security will continue to fail.

4.  Major Breaches in Sectors with Intellectual Property.

5.  Hacktivists will bask in their new-found glory.

6.  Critical Infrastructure Attacks.

7.  Hello Android.

8.  Windows Kernel Exploits.

9.  Organized Crime rises.

10.  Congress will rear its head.

Read full paragraph that goes with each of the above….

Phi Beta Iota: Nothing wrong with any of the above, except that they are out of context.  As the still-valid cyber-threat slide created by Mitch Kabay in the 1990's shows, 70% of our losses have nothing to do with disgruntled or dishonest insiders, or external attacks including viruses.  Cyber has not been defined, in part because the Human Intelligence crowd does not compute circuits, and the circuit crowd do not computer human intelligence.  We are at the very beginning of a startling renaissance in cyber/Information Operations (IO) in which–we predict–existing and near-term hardware and software vulnerabilities will be less than 30% of the problem.  Getting analog Cold War leaders into new mind-sets, and educating all hands toward sharing rather than hoarding, toward multinational rather than unilateral, will be key aspects of our progress.  Cyber is life, life is cyber–it's all connected.  Stove-piped “solutions” make it worse.

See Also:

Graphic: OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act)

Journal: 1 in 4 Fail US Army Extrance Exam

Journal: Development at Gunpoint? Wasteful & Wrong

Undersea Cables: The Achilles Heel of our Economies

Journal: NSA Assumes It Has Been Compromised…Correct!

Reference: Frog 6 Guidance 2010-2020

Journal: NSA Assumes It Has Been Compromised…Correct!

Computer/online security, InfoOps (IO), Intelligence (government), Methods & Process, Open Government, Reform, Secrecy & Politics of Secrecy, Standards, Strategy, Technologies, Waste (materials, food, etc)

U.S. Code-Cracking Agency Works As If Compromised. The U.S. government's main code-making and code-cracking agency now works on the assumption that foes may have pierced even the most sensitive national security computer networks under its guard.

“There's no such thing as ‘secure' any more,” Debora Plunkett of the National Security Agency said on Thursday amid U.S. anger and embarrassment over disclosure of sensitive diplomatic cables by the website WikiLeaks.

“The most sophisticated adversaries are going to go unnoticed on our networks,” she said.

Plunkett heads the NSA's Information Assurance Directorate, which is responsible for protecting national security information and networks from the foxhole to the White House.

“We have to build our systems on the assumption that adversaries will get in,” she told a cyber security forum sponsored by the Atlantic and Government Executive media organizations.

The United States can't put its trust “in different components of the system that might have already been violated,” Plunkett added in a rare public airing of NSA's view on the issue. “We have to, again, assume that all the components of our system are not safe, and make sure we're adjusting accordingly.”

The NSA must constantly fine tune its approach, she said, adding that there was no such thing as a “static state of security.”

More than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break into U.S. networks, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn wrote in the September/October issue of the journal Foreign Affairs. Some already have the capacity to disrupt U.S. information infrastructure, he said. Plunkett declined to comment on WikiLeaks, which has started releasing a cache of 250,000 diplomatic cables, including details of overseas installations that officials regard as vital to U.S. security.

Official have focused publicly on Army Private Bradley Manning, who is being detained at a Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, as the source of the leak.

NSA, a secretive Defense Department arm that also intercepts foreign communications, conceives of the problem as maintaining the availability and assuring the integrity of the systems it guards, rather than their “security,” she said.

NSA – which insiders jokingly used to say referred to “No Such Agency” – also focuses on standardization and auditing to hunt for any intrusions, Plunkett said. She referred to the development of sensors for eventual deployment “in appropriate places within our infrastructure” to detect threats and take action against them.

Mike McConnell, a retired Navy vice admiral who headed the NSA from 1992 to 1996, told the forum he believed no U.S. government network was safe from penetration.

A third-party inspection of major computer systems found there was none of consequence “that is not penetrated by some adversary that allows the adversary, the outsider, to bleed all the information at will,” said McConnell, director of national intelligence from 2007 to 2009 and now leader of the intelligence business for the Booz Allen Hamilton consultancy.[Wolf/Reuters/18December2010]

Phi Beta Iota: In 1992 NSA knew that shrink-wrapped hardware and software coming across its loading dock was pre-compromised with both hardware and software viruses, Trojan Horse backdoors, and so on.  In 1994 the National Information Infrastructure “leadership” refused to address the need for a $1 billion a year national cyber-security program.  Since then it has simply gotten worse, with the latest (in the last four years) being the ability of the Chinese to ride the electrical circuits into any computer (think of your Best Buy ethernet extender that uses the wiring as a pass through).  The good news is that 90% of what we have behind the green and black doors is not really secret or in such obscure minutia as to be immaterial to national security.  What we should be doing, in our view as the proponent for public intelligence, is this:

1.  Default both Whole of Government and Multinational Engagement to unclassified.  Civil Affairs can lead the way with the Joint Civil Affairs Information Management Sytem that feeds the high side everything, but keeps the open system open.

2.  Set a notional limit of 10% of what can be classified secret within any Embassy, roughly 8% for the spies and 2% for everyone else.

3.  Take the most sensitive stuff completely off the electrical grid (the real reason NSA wants its own power station at Fort Meade and in Utah).

4.  Invest one third of the cyber-war budget, whatever it ends up being (probably half), in education & research relevant to all stakeholders, not just the national security community.  It is not possible to have smart safe spies within a dumb unsafe nation.  It's all connected.

Turning away from secrecy is the single best thing we can do as a government, as a military, as a nation.  It will yield productivity and innovation and foreign relations dividends beyond our dreams.

Everybody who's a real practitioner, and I'm sure you're not all naïve in this regard, realizes that there are two uses to which security classification is put: the legitimate desire to protect secrets, and the protection of bureaucratic turf. As a practitioner of the real world, it's about 90 bureaucratic turf; 10 legitimate protection of secrets as far as I am concerned.

Rodney McDaniel, then Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, to a Harvard University seminar, as cited in Thomas P. Croakley (ed), C3I: Issues of Command and Control (National Defense University, 1991). Page 68.

Undersea Cables: The Achilles Heel of our Economies

03 Economy, 07 Other Atrocities, 11 Society, Computer/online security

Franz-Stefan Gady

Franz-Stefan Gady

Foreign policy analyst, EastWest Institute

Huffington Post, Posted: December 21, 2010 02:20 PM

In December 2008 within milliseconds, Egypt lost 70 percent of its connection to the outside Internet. In far away India, 50 to 60 percent of online connectivity similarly was lost. In Pakistan, 12 million people were knocked offline suddenly, and in Saudi Arabia, 4.7 million were unable to connect to the Internet. The economic costs of this 24-hour outage: approximately 64 million dollars.

The recent revelations by WikiLeaks of U.S. national security interests in critical infrastructure vulnerabilities mention the often neglected underpinning of the current connectivity revolution sweeping the planet–undersea cables. In December 2008, four undersea cables were cut simultaneously, affecting Internet users all over the world. While cable cuts happen from time to time nothing, the scope of the cuts illustrate the exposure of our economies to disruption once we lose connectivity.

Read full article….

Phi Beta Iota: In 1990 Peter Black published a “top ten” hit list for cyber-space in WIRED Magazine, and the conventionals went nuts.  Shortly thereafter Winn Schwartau testified to Congress on the possibilities of an electronic Pearl Harbor, and Robert Steele added to the conventional hysteria by pointing out that absent “action this day,” there would indeed be a day off reckoning in the future.  Now here's the key bit (not byte):  Information Operations (IO) is mostly about information access, assurance, and analysis. It's about ensuring that the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide Act) Loop for all deciders, all action officers, all front-line mission specialists, is as good as it can get.  It's about culture, education, leadership, mentoring. A huge part of that lies in addressing human errors & omissions, fully 50% of the data or capability loss; and in the design of the over-all global, national, state, and local information architectures.  Redundancy, for example–but we still have companies putting BOTH cables in the same ditch where they can be cut by ONE swipe of a backhoe….  The underwater cables (not just in the ocean but in inland waters as well) have been pointed out as the Achilles heel since at least 1990, 20 years ago.  One wonders what it will take …..

See Also:

Journal: Weaponizing Web 2.0

Journal: Information Security Seven Guiding Principles

1994 Sounding the Alarm on Cyber-Security

Review: INFORMATION WARFARE–Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway

Review: Terminal Compromise

Your Apps Are Watching You…AND Reporting Intimate Details Without Your Consent…

Civil Society, Commerce, Commercial Intelligence, Computer/online security, Corruption, InfoOps (IO), IO Secrets, Mobile, Privacy

Your Apps Are Watching You

A WSJ Investigation finds that iPhone and Android apps are breaching the privacy of smartphone users

By SCOTT THURM and YUKARI IWATANI KANE

Wall Street Journal, Sunday, December 18, 2010

Few devices know more personal details about people than the smartphones in their pockets: phone numbers, current location, often the owner's real name—even a unique ID number that can never be changed or turned off.

These phones don't keep secrets. They are sharing this personal data widely and regularly, a Wall Street Journal investigation has found.

Continue reading “Your Apps Are Watching You…AND Reporting Intimate Details Without Your Consent…”

Could Rovio or CCP kill Microsoft or Google?

Analysis, Augmented Reality, Budgets & Funding, Collaboration Zones, Collective Intelligence, Communities of Practice, Computer/online security, Counter-Oppression/Counter-Dictatorship Practices, info-graphics/data-visualization, InfoOps (IO), IO Mapping, IO Multinational, IO Sense-Making, Journalism/Free-Press/Censorship, Key Players, Methods & Process, Mobile, Policies, Real Time, Reform, Standards, Strategy, Technologies, Threats, Tools
Ric Merrifield

When you think about who might topple a software giant like a Microsoft or a Google, you might be inclined to think of Goliaths like, well Google and Microsoft.  The same is true of any industry, you probably think of a company of similar size or larger as being the type of company that would win a battle, or a war.

Actual battles and wars end up being an interesting analogy.  If you think if big battles like World War I and World War II, that’s exactly what happened – giants fighting giants from big, knowable centralized points of command.  But there are some other wars that have been fought where the little guy won (or hasn’t lost in the case of one ongoing war) and there’s a common element in all of them.  No centralized physical location to “take out” to win.  When everything is dispersed and there isn’t any one thing to take out, it’s hard to really know how big or how small opposing force is, and they can be substantially more agile.  In this situation, an organization of any size can pose a major threat to an enormous organization.  The war on terror is an ongoing war that fits this profile – it’s virtually impossible to know how big or small the opposition is, or where they are at any given time, so it’s very hard to be ready for an attack from them.  Viet Nam was a tough one for the US to really stand a chance in because it was in unfamiliar territory and there was no central location to take out to declare victory.  One could even make the same argument (at a high level) for why the British lost the American revolution.

So if you don’t know who Rovio or CCP are, I have already made significant progress on the path of making my point.

Continue reading “Could Rovio or CCP kill Microsoft or Google?”