I will not replicate all that is at www.oss.net and to a much lesser extent, www.earth-intelligence.net, but do want to recognize a handful of extraordinary individuals by isolating their especially meritorious contributiions to the long-running debate about national intelligence reform and re-invention.
The Director of National Intelligence issued a directive last month prescribing procedures for major system acquisitions by elements of the intelligence community.
The directive defines a multi-phase process for identifying critical needs, evaluating alternative paths to meet those needs, and so forth.
Phi Beta Iota: A sad little document of no value what-so-ever. This is a process for stove-piping that sets no standards for a) assuring that all collection can be processed; b) assuring that all processing collection can be shared; or c) assuring that the IC is moving as quickly as possible toward Open Source Everything (OSE) as well as M4IS2 (Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Shariing and Sense-Making). The DNI and ODNI appear to be distracted, incoherent, largely ineffective, and long over-due for elimination.
CNN: Peter wrote what I think is (one of the) most … interesting and compelling articles about the Hagel nomination, explaining it perhaps better than anyone I've seen, including the president.
The first paragraph of the piece, you write, it may prove the most consequential foreign policy appointment of his presidency because the struggle over Hagel is a struggle over whether Obama can change the terms of the foreign policy debate. Explain that for me.
Peter Beinart: I think so far, the debate about military action in Iran has been conducted by and large in Washington, as if Iraq and Afghanistan didn't happen.
As if we haven't learned anything from the disaster (of) these two wars over the last 10 years. I think the real struggle between Hagel and his foes is he wants to bring some of the lessons in to the Iran debate that we learned about (Iraq) and Afghanistan.
He talks very compellingly about the fact wars once launched can't be fully controlled. He is very cognizant of the enormous financial cost that these wars have imposed on the United States, and I think the heart of the hostility is the fear that his recognition about what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq will make taking us to war in Iran harder.
By J.K. Trotter | The Atlantic Wire – Fri, Dec 28, 2012
“The CIA is a lot different than Hollywood portrays it to be,” reads an official explainer issued today by the Central Intelligence Agency — a thinly veiled attempt to continue debunking Zero Dark Thirty, the controversial Oscar favorite that its director admittedly hates. Referring to James Bond, the fictional MI6 agent, depictions of “shootouts and high speed chases,” and scenes of “CIA officers chasing terrorists through the American heartland,” the memo goes on to try and dispel an array of “myths” pertaining to the agency's operations, from its impact on foreign policy to its ability to spy on Americans. The effort follows a December 21 letter addressed to CIA employees from the agency's acting director, Michael Morrell, concerning the “artistic license” of Zero Dark Thirty. Today's release touches on the same themes: whether the CIA of our popular imagination corresponds to the CIA of reality, and how movies like Zero Dark Thirty (which isn't name-checked directly) blur the distinction between fact and fantasy. Should you believe the CIA's interpretation of Hollywood? We break down each agency claim with actual details from the movies — and Homeland, obviously.
Robert David STEELE Vivas Click on Image for Personal Page
Telling the truth to those who have replaced intelligence with ideology and integrity with loyalty to something other than their Republic is most difficult and more often than not will get you fired, because those without integrity tend to be promoted in corrupt systems, and they see clearly the threat to their world-view — and their perks — of someone who persists in pointing out that the truth at any cost reduces all other costs.
Reform can be job and revenue neutral from state to state and district to district — and is of course subject to Congressional oversight via the authorization and appropriations process. Below are seven truths about the US military that I would like to see introduced into the hearings on the confirmation of the next Secretary of Defense, and ideally also tasked to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), where the senior specialist for each of the major services is capable of validating my views.
The international challenges which threaten the security of the United States and our partners in the 21st century are not primarily posed by conventional military forces. Despite the “pivot” toward a conventional peer competitor in Asia, the predominant source of conflict in the 21st century has been and will continue to be driven by events in fragile or failing states. Of the 27 active conflicts in the world today, only one is a traditional interstate war. Due to the forces of globalization, strife and conflict in these regions now can directly impact the security of citizens within our borders. Unaddressed conflict in these regions gives rise to organized crime networks which engage in trafficking of weapons, drugs, people and WMD components. Ethnic violence results in civil wars which often lead to humanitarian catastrophes and refugee migrations. Ungoverned space may result in terrorist sanctuaries and the spread of radical ideologies and beliefs. The most likely deployment mission will not be to engage against a traditional state’s military, but to engage in an unconventional conflict against non-state foes that use asymmetric tactics.
International security organizations and individual nations have various terms and definitions to address the range of possible operations to address security problems in fragile or failing states: Peace Operations, Peace Support Operations or Stability Operations are commonly used terms. The U.S Department of Defense (DOD) describes Stability Operations as: Military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief (Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009, para. 3). Most often, regional security organizations, such as NATO or the African Union, empowered by the legitimacy of a UN Security Council mandate, form the headquarters or nucleus for ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” to carry out these missions. ISAF in Afghanistan, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the NATO-led coalition operations in Libya are recent examples of this model. Due to the nature of the missions the military, while a major actor, is only one member of a wider interagency, comprehensive, “whole of government” team assembled to address security, governance, humanitarian and economic developmental needs.
There are numerous, complex challenges to producing and disseminating timely, accurate and fused intelligence to support these operations. Each step of the intelligence process must be adapted to meet the evolving needs of commanders, decision makers, soldiers and civilian partners on the ground. In this era of declining defense budgets, what lessons should intelligence professionals be incorporating into training and educational programs to make success more likely during the next deployment to a fragile or failed state? The following eight examples provide some insights to performing well in a complex environment.It is incumbent on leaders to communicate with and empower their intelligence officers to anticipate mission and information challenges. Incorporating aspects of these examples in training and education programs will help to ensure success on the next deployment.
Agree that we are at a potentially historic transition point. However, the Atlantic Council lacks the strategic analytic model to make the most of its otherwise formidable brain trust. Agree on the need for a new mental map, but they chose the wrong map. See the HourGlass Strategy as an alternative (also below the line).
The report misses multiple big possibilities including the eight tribes, M4IS2, and OSE.
1. Frame second-term policies from a more strategic and long-term perspective, recognizing the magnitude of the moment and the likelihood that the United States’ actions now will have generational consequences.
Absolutely. Understanding emergent public governance trends rooted in true cost and whole system analytics, which harness the distributed intelligence of the five billion poor, not in this report.
2. Continue to emphasize what has been called “nation-building at home” as the first foreign policy priority, without neglecting its global context.
Left unsaid is the need to establish a plan, coincident with the creation of a 450-ship Navy, a long-haul Air Force, and an air-liftable Army, to close most of our military bases around the world, and bring all of our troops – and their purchasing power – home.
