Solid History of Two Successes, Hidden Story of Failure,
June 28, 2000
Stuart Herrington
This book, highly recommended by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), grabbed me from the beginning. Stuart, whom I know as one of the most thoughtful and self-effacing Colonels in military intelligence, wisely chooses to focus on the two most important cases in recent U.S. military history. For a catalog of all the others, see “Merchants of Treason” by Tom Allen and Norman Polmar. A few things about this valuable book bear emphasis here: 1) early on, the FBI tried to shut the CIA out of the first case, and Col Herrington very wisely insisted on including them–leading to critical CIA contributions without which the case would not have been solved; 2) counterintelligence is incredible tedious, boring, *hard* work, and it takes a special kind of commander to maintain morale under such circumstances; 3) both Defense and Justice lawyers screwed up big-time by not being aware that military intelligence activities in Austria were illegal in Austria and therefore warranted early involvement of the Austrian government–this ignorance cost us heavily; 4) allowing soldiers to “homestead” in sensitive intelligence positions anywhere is very dangerous; and finally–bringing to bear some personal knowledge here–5) success is temporary, failure is forever…I'll wager the Army's Foreign Counterintelligence Activity has gone downhill since this book was written, and that the old “go along easy” habits of those that have been homesteading too long at FCA are again rearing their ugly heads. Counterintelligence is still a backwater, and any commander, however exceptional, is going to need strong Service-level support if they are to keep their senior civil servant (bureaucratic) elements in line. This book is an excellent touchstone for Congressional members and staff, Service and DoD chiefs who care little for counterintelligence but need to do more, and for citizens who need to know that counterintelligence is on the “front lines” every day, in every clime and place.
Enduring Classic on the Hard Truth about Changing Minds,
May 29, 2000
Thomas S. Kuhn
Two points are worthy of emphasis: 1) the paradigm shift is always forced and 2) until the paradigm shift occurs, always suddenly, the incumbents can comfortably explain everything with their existing paradigm. There will be many from the current “laissez faire” academics without accountability environment who would be critical of this book, but the fact is that it's fundamentals are on target; as the sociology of knowledge has shown time and time again, “thinkers” are nepotistic, incestuous, and generally lazy, as well as mono-lingual and culturally-constrained, and it takes a major shock-wave to push any given intellectual domain up to the next plateau.
First published in 1938, a modern edition is vastly improved by the addition of a critical introduction by Alan Mayne. Very much focused on how a world-brain might alter national policy-making, how Public Opinion or an “Open Conspiracy” might restore common sense and popular control to arenas previously reserved for an elite. The information functionality of the World Brain easily anticipated the world wide web as it might evolve over the next 20-30 years: comprehensive, up to date, distributed, classification scheme, dynamic, indexes, summaries and surveys, freely available and easily accessible. We have a long way to go, but the framework is there. The communication functions of the world brain would include a highly effective information retrieval system, selective dissemination of information, efficient communication facilities, effective presentation, popular education, public and individual awareness for all issues, and facilitate social networking between organizations, groups, and individuals. The world brain is the “virtual intelligence community” qua noosphere. This is one of the fundamental references for anyone thinking about the future of politics, economics, or social systems.
This is a book that had to be written and needs to be read by those who seek to understand Allen Dulles in greater depth. The author does break new ground and add valuable new detail to the history of Allen Dulles, and his hard work in bringing us this book merits appreciation. Having said that, I confess to three disappointments: 1) the use of years to demarcate the chapters, rather than meaningful titles, is both boring and representative of the book's lack of presentational “zing”; 2) the book obsesses on Allen Dulles as the center of the earth and leaves out the context within which Dulles achieved his successes-casual references to how he operated two additional French networks, for example, without covering the arduous and detailed path that led to the creation and maintenance of those networks, leave one feeling as if Dulles simply waved a magic wand to create networks whole-bodied and in full force; and 3) the conclusion of the book, purportedly a review of what Allen Dulles would see and feel if he examined today's intelligence community, is generally on target but rather terse-nothing that one could take to an incoming President to energize him into revitalizing and enhancing our national intelligence community. There are some gems in this book that reflect the author's dedication and merit notice: Richard Helms reflecting on how America came much too close to losing World War II; Walt Rostow on calming the Kennedy's and preventing a rash counter-attack once the Bay of Pigs was known to be a disaster-this is the stuff of history, and I therefore heartily recommend this book as a valuable contribution to our understanding of Allen Dulles' place in history.
Kevin has produced what I regard as one of the top five books of this decade. A very tough read but worth the effort. I had not understood the entire theory of co-evolution developed by Stewart Brand and represented in the Co-Evolution Quarterly and The Whole Earth until I read this book. Kevin introduces the concept of the “hive mind”, addresses how biological systems handle complexity, moves over into industrial ecology and network economics, and concludes with many inspiring reflections on the convergence of biological and technical systems. He was easily a decade if not two ahead of his time.
Persico has done a wonderful job of capturing Casey's magnificent complexity and intellectual voraciousness. Oddly enough the best quote in there, part of a really excellent over-all description of why the DO does not succeed, comes from Herb Meyer when he was a special assistant to Casey: “These guys have built a system that shuts them off from any intelligence except what you can steal. These people needed to be reconnected to reality.”