The New York Times — aka America's Gray Lady of journalism — loves to refer to itself as the newspaper of record — but whose record? After the NYT's sorry exposure of being a activist conduit for government disinformation and propaganda hyping the WMD fears leading up to invasion of Iraq in 2003, a reasonable person might expect it would have cleaned up its act. Glenn Greenwald's withering expose below suggests the NYT's dreary gray covers pomposities cover a darker journalistic dna that is no longer prone to self correction, if it ever was.
Chuck Spinney
Gaeta, Italia
EXTRACT:
From “All the news that's fit to print” to “please delete after you read” and cannot “go into detail because it is an intelligence matter”: that's the gap between the New York Times's marketed brand and its reality.
Published by ALNAP, the 2012 State of the Humanitarian System report is an important evaluation of the humanitarian community’s efforts over the past two years. “I commend this report to all those responsible for planning and delivering life saving aid around the world,” writes UN Under-Secretary General Valerie Amos in the Preface. “If we are going to improve international humanitarian response we all need to pay attention to the areas of action highlighted in the report.” Below are some of the highlighted areas from the 100+ page evaluation that are ripe for innovative interventions.
Accessing Those in Need
Operational access to populations in need has not improved. Access problems continue and are primarily political or security-related rather than logistical. Indeed, “UN security restrictions often place sever limits on the range of UN-led assessments,” which means that “coverage often can be compromised.” This means that “access constraints in some contexts continue to inhibit an accurate assessment of need. Up to 60% of South Sudan is inaccessible for parts of the year. As a result, critical data, including mortality and morbidity, remain unavailable. Data on nutrition, for example, exist in only 25 of 79 countries where humanitarian partners have conducted surveys.”
Could satellite and/or areal imagery be used to measure indirect proxies? This would certainly be rather imperfect but perhaps better than nothing? Could crowdseeding be used?
5.0 out of 5 stars Foundation Work Not Yet Appreciated,August 28, 2012
In 1992 I was the second-ranking civilian in Marine Corps intelligence, and with the support of the Marine Corps, sought to get National Intelligence Topics moved from denied areas that were few in number and declining in importance, toward “low-intensity” threats and conditions in the Third World. The Marine Corps also tried to shift the US intelligence collection system from “priority driven” (collect over and over on the same limited set of targets) to “gap driven” (do a first pass on everything, then start over focusing on gaps). I've been thinking for a very long time about the deficiencies in US diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) predispositions, bias, capabilities, and Achilles heels. I had more or less given up on the US Government specifically ever coming to its senses, when a bolt of lighting came out of the blue — Admiral James Stavrides, Supreme Commander for NATO, gave a TED talk about “open source security.” That is code for a complex range of things called Operations Other Than War (OOTW), Stabilization & Reconstruction (S&R), Public Diplomacy, and International Assistance, among other things. The US stinks at all of them, in part because we do not have a Whole of Government strategy, operations, intelligence, and logistics approach to anything — stovepipes, each badly managed and crossing wires, seem to be the standard. The “M” in the Office of Management and Budget is not just silent, it is non-existent.
While I have read many other books relevant to the ideal of creating a prosperous world at peace, a world that works for all, this book was recommended to me as a starting point for avanced thinking in non-violent peace and prosperity operations, as I like to think of them, along with the author's previous work, The politics of nonviolent action (Extending horizons books).
This is a practical book with very specific case studies and very specific itemizations (198 of them) that may replicate some of the author's earlier work, but easily make this one book a stand-alone reference work for advanced studies by diplomats, warriors, and policy wonks long isolated from the real world. This book is not a replacement for Howard Zinn's A Power Governments Cannot Suppress or Jonathan Schell's The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People. The three go well together.
This is a multi-purpose volume. One can skip the case studies and ingest the beginning and the end, which is what I did, or one can use the volume as a distributed reading and research exercise–if I were using it each case study would be the foundation for a student paper on what never happened — the obliviousness of the UN, NATO, the US, etcetera, to the non-violent intervention points and the importance of NOT persisting with support to dictators and foreign military sales. As an aside, the dirty little secret of the CIA is that they are never serious about deposing evil, they just like to toy with dissidents on the margins — the best documentary on this long-standing fact is Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times.
I value the book for the brevity of its main point: non-violent power is real and practical and has many manifestations (most of them not really known to me in a coherent scheme before reading this book). State power is context dependent, and much — *much* — more subject to public will than most realize.
5.0 out of 5 stars 6 for Intelligence & Integrity, 4 For Lacking Visualizations,August 28, 2012
As an intelligence professional constantly dismayed by the lack of both intelligence and integrity in the profession, and as someone who has specialized in “Information Pathologies” for the last 20 years, I have to rate this book into my top 10% across over 1800 books reviewed here at Amazon, it is beyond a 5, it is a six. This is a profound, provocative book that re-establishes the gold standard in ethical, holistic analytics.
The book is too important to leave it as is, a bland 300+ pages of text. While the index and footnotes are world-class, there is no annotated bibliography and not a single visualization (I am loading three images above but they barely scratch the surface). This book needs to be republished and to include a series of at least ten but ideally closer to twenty visualizations of both the reality of Jewish communities over time, and the intellectual genealogy of the Jewish myth.
As the leading Amazon reviewer for non-fiction, reading in 98 categories (access my Amazon reviews by category and star rating at Phi Beta Iota the Public Intelligence Blog), and as an academic, government, and commercial intelligence professional who obsesses on the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, I put this book into not just my top 10% (roughly 200 books in past decade) but in my top DOZEN books across my lifetime. The methodical, ethical, integrative, holistic, balanced manner in which this author has carried out his work is in my view the GOLD STANDARD for what any intelligence professional should be capable of aspiring to. Certainly this book is ideal as a foundation for a critical analytics course in which the students–including especially mid-career students that have gotten by on cutting and pasting and regurgitating crap by others–are forced to confront the multiple realities that include every Information Pathology known to man, including history books that are fiction, political statements that are outright lies, and a recurring pattern of war crimes that regardless of what they are called (e.g. settlements, isolation by ghettoization, etcetera) are war crimes.
As I went through this masterful work, the phrase “render unto Ceasar” kept popping into my head. The author develops his arguments, his proofs, and his critique of the historiography of others in a most compelling manner (but absent the visualizations which drove me crazy throughout).
Concerns over their cost effectiveness and strategic value make the deployment of PMSCs a risky proposition. More worryingly, argues David Isenberg, is that they may permit governments to circumnavigate democratic debates over the necessity of sending armed forces into battle.
By David Isenberg for the ISN
From the outset, it needs to be established that the use of private military and security contractors (PMSC) – whether in wars or humanitarian and stabilization operations – is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, even if this was the case, the United States is unlikely to decrease its reliance on them in the future, if for no other reason than the fact that contractors are now essential to maintaining the U.S. military’s vast network of overseas bases and facilities. But it is also true that the deployment of PMSCs does not always make sense. Indeed, just because contractors are often unfairly vilified doesn’t mean that their claims should be taken at face value. Yet, like any other issue worthy of debate the devil is always in the details. Questions concerned with how PMSCs will be used, who monitors contracts for proper implementation – not to mention the challenge of developing transparency and accountability processes – are questions that have far too often been answered by trial and error.
“Still Left in the Dark? How People in Emergencies Use Communication to Survive — And How Humanitarian Agencies Can Help” is an excellent report pub-lished by the BBC World Service Trust earlier this year. It is a follow up to the BBC’s 2008 study “Left in the Dark: The Unmet Need for Information in Humanitarian Emergencies.” Both reports are absolute must-reads. I highlight the most important points from the 2012 publication below.
I read “Doubling SaaS Revenue by Changing the Pricing Model.” If you are involved in charging for online pricing, you will want to work through this write up by the founder of Kalzumeus Software. What makes the article valuable is its real world data. The article describes a “highly configurable pricing plan” with a low-cost option model which, based on the author’s analysis, is inefficient. The revenue friction is that low-ball customers cost more to support than informed customers. The “free” crowd will find the Kalzumeus analysis disturbing.
The path to pricing happiness according to the write up is via a hybrid approach. The trick is to use a tiered pricing plan with options. Listen to the Kalzumeus argument. Note: we tidied up the grammar for clarity.
The advice … was that Server Density switches to a SaaS pricing model with 3 or 4 tiers segmented loosely by usage, and break with the linear charging. The advantages [of this approach are]:
