Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

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The future of OSINT is M4IS2.

The future of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is Multinational, Multifunctional, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing & Sense-Making (M4IS2).

The following, subject to the approval of Executive and Congressional leadership, are suggested hueristics (rules of thumb):

Rule 1: All Open Source Information (OSIF) goes directly to the high side (multinational top secret) the instant it is received at any level by any civilian or military element responsive to global OSINT grid.  This includes all of the contextual agency and mission specific information from the civilian elements previously stove-piped or disgarded, not only within the US, but ultimately within all 90+ participating nations.

Rule 2: In return for Rule 1, the US IC agrees that the Department of State (and within DoD, Civil Affairs) is the proponent outside the wire, and the sharing of all OSIF originating outside the US IC is at the discretion of State/Civil Affairs without secret world caveat or constraint.  OSIF collected by US IC elements is NOT included in this warrant.

Continue reading “Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]”

Reform Archives for Public Intelligence (1992-2006)

Reform

2006

US

Reform Steele Open Source Intelligence Familiarization Documents (One Page of Links)

2004

US

Reform Atlee A Model of Intelligence Systems (Individual to Social)

2004

US

Reform Atlee Beyond Intelligence Reform Toward Co-Intelligence

2004

Austria

Reform Beer Need for a Theory of Intelligence

2004

US

Reform Harris Beautiful Minds: Maverick Minds Needed to Achieve Reform

2004

US

Reform Marrin Improving Training for New Analysts

2004

NL

Reform Wiebes Intelligence and the War in Bosnia

2003

CA

Reform Fyffe OSS ’03 Presentation on Information Sharing

2002

Israel

Reform Crevald van Twenty Four Theses on Intelligence

2002

US

Reform Herz Harnessing the Hive via Online Games for Networked Innovation

2002

US

Reform Pinkham Citizen Advocacy in the Information Age

2001

US

Reform Foster Getting to Tomorrow: A Plea for Strategic Reformation

2001

US

Reform Gessaman Summary of Comments on National Security Budget with Slides

2001

US

Reform Treverton Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information

Military Archives on Public Intelligence (1992-2006)

Military
Archives 1992-2006
Archives 1992-2006

2005

US

Military Steele US Army Conference: E3i: Making the Revolution

2005

US

Military USA Army Modernization Briefing

2004

US

Military Simmons Foreword to the Draft SOF OSINT Handbook

2004

NL

Military Wiebes SIGINT in Bosnia

2003

US

Military Hardee OSINT in Support of Special Operations

2003

US

Military Harrison OSINT Requirements, Collection, & Production Management

2003

US

Military Steele SOUTHCOM: Strategic Threat Assessment

2003

US

Military Steele AFCEA Texas: C4I Revolution and National Security

2003?

US

Military Steele To SecDef: Force Structure Trade-Offs and the Real World

2002

US

Military Hardee Growing an Open Source Intelligence Program

2001

US

Military Steele AUSA: Intelligence Support to a Transforming Army

2001

US

Military Steele AWC: Welcome to the Real World: Force Structure Trade-Offs

2000

CA

Military Cox OSINT at SHAPE…Some Musings

2000

FR

Military Debat The Challenge of Informing European Defence Decisions

2000

US

Military Hughes Open Sources and Intelligent Solutions

2000

Austria

Military Mueller Austrian Military Intelligence Thoughts on OSINT

2000

UK

Military Regan The UK Ministry of Defence OSINT Program

2000

US

Military Reynolds U.S. Transportation Command OSINT

2000

US

Military Steele Briefing to NATO/PfP: One World Ready or Not

1999

US

Military Clark EAGLE VISION: USAF Initiative for Tactical Receipt of Imagery

1999

US

Military Connors PACOM Additional Slides on VIC

1999

US

Military Connors U.S. Pacific Command’s Virtual Information Center (VIC)

1999

US

Military Dearth Intelligence in the 21st Century

1999

US

Military Lee Summary of Military Map Availabililty for Iran

1999

US

Military Myers & Madison Virtual Information Center Concept Refinement

1999

US

Military Prinslow & Bond Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies

1999

US

Military Steele Overview of OSINT Issues & OSINT Utility to DoD

1999

US

Military Steele Setting the Stage for Information Sharing in the 21st Century: 3 Issues

1999

US

Military Steele What Do We Need to Know and Where Do We Get It? (Slides)

1999

US

Military Steele Expeditionary Environment in the 21st Century

1999

US

Military Wirtz Bridging the Culture Gap: OSINT and the Tet Offensive

1998

US

Military Beavers & Shanahan Operationalizing IO in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Book Chapter)

1998

SE

Military Bjore Open Sources and Methods for the Military

1998

SE

Military Bjore OSINT Lessons Learned

1998

UK

Military Rathmell Assessing the IW Threat from Sub-State Groups

1998

US

Military Steele INFORMATION PEACEKEEPING: Purest Form of War (Outline)

1998

US

Military Steele Skeptical Assessment of USN-USMC Based on Real-World OSINT

1998

US

Military Steele TAKEDOWN: The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation

1998

UK

Military Tyrrell OSINT: The Challenge for NATO

1997

US

Military Alger IATAC: Building a Knowledge Base of Emerging IAT

1997

US

Military Clark EAGLE VISION: Tactical Downlink Station for Imagery

1997

US

Military Clinton Managing Complex Contingency Operations

1997

US

Military Molholm DTIC: Building a Virtual Knowledge Warehouse

1997

US

Military Necoba The Marines and OSINT

1997

US

Military Pedtke National Air Intelligence Center Science & Technology OSINT

1997

US

Military Steele CINC Brief: The One that Got CINCSOC (Now CSA) to Buy In

1997

US

Military Steele Creating a Bare Bones OSINT  Capability (Slides)

1997

US

Military Steele Creating a Bare Bones OSINT Unit for DIA

1997

US

Military Steele CINCSOC 10 Minute Brief on OSINT

1997

US

Military Vesely Striking A Balance: National, Operational, & Tactical Acquisition

1996

US

Military Smith Defense Mapping Agency and the Commercial Sector

1996

US

Military Steele Open Source Intelligence Handbook, Chapter 5, OSINT and Military

1996

US

Military Steele DIA/JMITC: National Knowledge Strategy & Revolution in Intelligence

1996

US

Military Stein Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic Needs for Remote Sensing Data

1995

SE

Military Bjore Six Years of Open Source Information (OSI): Lessons Learned

1995

US

Military Dandar Army Intelligence XXI, Open Source Status Report

1995

US

Military Dandar OSIF Exploitation for Army Intelligence XXI: Summary

1995

UK

Military Garfield Update on the UK MoD OSINT Programme (Slides)

1995

UK

Military Garfield Update on the UK MoD OSINT Programme (Text)

1995

US

Military Ricardeli OSINT in Support of Haiti Invasion (Slides)

1995

US

Military Ricardeli OSINT in Support of Haiti Invasion (Text)

1995

US

Military Steele The Military Perspective on Information Warfare: Apocalypse Now

1995

US

Military Steele AWC: Open Source Intelligence for the Military

1994

US

Military Brooks & McKeeyer Split-Based Ops in DESERT STORM: Glimpse of the Future Digital Army

1994

US

Military Munro INFORMATION WARFARE: Snake Eaters Meet Net-Heads

1994

US

Military Pedtke NAIC & The Intelligence Community Open Source Architecture

1994

US

Military Steele DIA/JMITC: NS via the Reinvention of National & Defense Intelligence

1992

US

Military Clift Military OSINT Requirements, Capabilities, and Contracting Directions

1992

US

Military Pedtke et al NAIC S&T Open Source Intelligence Requirements & Capabilities

1992

US

Military Petersen New Roles for the U.S. Military

1992

US

Military Schwartau Introduction to Information Warfare

1992

US

Military Steele Intelligence Lessons Learned from Recent Expeditionary Operations

1992

US

Military Steele Comments Prepared for Future War Roundtable

1992

US

Military Strassmann Forcing Innovation, Cutting Costs, and Increasing Defense Productivity

1991

US

Military Steele Defense Intelligence Productivity in the 1990’s

1990

US

Military USMC & Steele Expeditionary Environment Research & Analysis Model

1990

US

Military USMC & Steele Expeditionary Mission Area Factors Summaries

2004 Wiebes (NL) Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 – 1995 The role of the intelligence and security services

Communities of Practice, Cultural Intelligence, Historic Contributions, Peace Intelligence
Cees Wiebes
Cees Wiebes

This extraordinary scholar benefits from being given access by an enlightened secret intelligence service whose Parliament demands full transparency as required.  His book is one of those very, very few that can legitimately claim to be fully informed from a full examination of all classified messages and archives, as well as the usual unclassified or publicly available information, and the author is himself an extraordinary scholar and a founding member of the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association, which which his photo connects absent an English-language biographic page.

This book is worth getting at any price from any source–we have urged the author to send us the book for a reprint at cost if his publisher will not do it imemdiately.  It should not be out of print.

Below left are his remarks on the book and his investigation as made to OSS ’04.

Cees Wiebes
Cees Wiebes

War on Bosnia

Review: Intelligence and the War in Bosnia–1992-1995 (Perspectives on Intelligence History)

5 Star, Asymmetric, Cyber, Hacking, Odd War, Atrocities & Genocide, Complexity & Catastrophe, Crime (Government), Empire, Sorrows, Hubris, Blowback, Force Structure (Military), History, Insurgency & Revolution, Intelligence (Government/Secret), Military & Pentagon Power, Misinformation & Propaganda, Peace, Poverty, & Middle Class, Politics, Power (Pathologies & Utilization), Religion & Politics of Religion, Stabilization & Reconstruction, Strategy, True Cost & Toxicity, Truth & Reconciliation, Voices Lost (Indigenous, Gender, Poor, Marginalized), War & Face of Battle

Amazon Page
Amazon Page

5.0 out of 5 stars Unique Blend of Lessons Learned and Tutorial on Intelligence,

September 24, 2003
Cees Wiebes
This is a superb publication. An American, who would never have received the kind of direct official support provided to the author by the government of The Netherlands, could not have written it.This is the only book that I know of that fully integrates deliberate studies of UN intelligence; Western and NATO intelligence (which the author correctly notes does not exist); Dutch intelligence; and belligerent party intelligence.

Several recurring themes of lasting value emerged from my reading of this book:

1) The UN is dangerously devoid of intelligence qua decision-support. The culture of the UN leadership, the UN bureaucracy, and the UN delegates is one that places a higher priority on the semblance–the mockery–of lip service to open sources and legal methods, while sacrificing the lives of UN forces in the field. One cannot read this book, and its superb documentation of how UN Force Commander after UN Force Commander pleaded for intelligence support, only to be told no by the staff in New York, without becoming very angry. This book makes it perfectly clear that the UN leadership failed the Croats, the Serbs, and the international peacekeepers, in every possible way. Toward the end of the book the author also focuses on the UN as a source for the belligerents, i.e. UN incapacity for operational security and secure communications in fact makes it a primary source for belligerents seeking to kill one another.

2) The West failed in Bosnia in part because it became over-reliant on technical intelligence (which it could not process or analyze with sufficient speed and reliability), and did not have adequate numbers of competent clandestine Human Intelligence (HUMINT) or even ground-truth observers in the region. A contributing source of failure was the evidently deliberate decision on the part of the Clinton White House to downplay the conflict and to withhold such intelligence warning as they did have from the UN, in the misplaced belief that sharing such information would interfere with the peace process. Tens of thousands died because of Clinton White House irresponsibility.

3) Intelligence “liaison” or structured sharing across national boundaries, was an ungodly mess made worse by the inherent biases and rose-colored glasses worn by the Americans and the British on one side, and the French and the Germans on the other. “Wishful thinking” by policy makers interfered with proper assessments of the relative condition and intentions of the various belligerents.

4) The CIA clandestine endeavor was split, with one Station operating out of Sarajevo and another out of Zagreb, and no overall coordination or integration of sources and reports.

5) Civil Affairs (CA) as a military occupational specialty is blown forever by CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) abuses, most without the permission of the U.S. European theater commander. CIA/DO managers should be disciplined for this breach of internal US government protocols.

6) The Dutch were not ready to field a major operational or tactical intelligence support architecture, and in-fighting among various elements prevented the various analysts from making the most of what little they could glean from varied sources. The same was actually true of all Western intelligence communities–all had other priorities and too few resources [although language deficiencies are not emphasized by the author, one presumed a grotesque lack of required competencies across the Croat and Serb dialects as well as Yugoslavian, Turkish, and Arabic]. In the view of a senior officer whose quotations close Chapter 3, heads should be rolling for dereliction of duty–although the subject refers only to the Dutch, the reviewer would add US and British heads as well.

7) The book excels–is remarkable and perhaps unique–for its discussion of the secret arms supplies–not only the routes, the providers, the landing zone delivery means–but the active violation by the US of the embargo, and the active role of US Special Forces in violating the embargo without a covert action “finding”, and hence also in violation of US law. Other nations were equally at fault. It is clear from the book that the UN needs not only operational and tactical intelligence for the specific area of operations, but an extended intelligence and operational capability sufficient to *interdict* incoming arms to the belligerents. This book may well be the single best reference on this topic.

8) The sections of the book on signals and imagery intelligence are a work of art, combining historical scholarship with original research and a very fine tutorial aspect. The listing of the 11 disadvantages of SIGINT (pages 224-228) is the finest I have ever seen. The bottom line in both instances is: too much collection, too little processing and analysis. The author uses a remarkable quote from a former Director of the National Security Agency to make this point: good news is that we can exploit a million messages a day; bad news is that we don’t know which million out of the billions we capture to do… Also interesting is the detailed accounting of belligerent party competencies in SIGINT and IMINT, to include the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and advanced methods.

9) The book ends with two notes that I choose to emphasize, although the author makes many valuable observations in his conclusions that I will not repeat here: first, support to UN operations was the *fifth* priority for Western intelligence, coming after force protection, after ground truth observation, after support for air targeting, and after support for NATO ground troop planning; and second, Doctors Without Borders, a non-governmental organization, was the *only* entity to get true validated warning of the Srebrenica genocide.

The index is terrible-names only. Properly indexing the book for references to all intelligence sources and methods as well as events and practices, would make it 2X to 3X more valuable as a basic reference.

This book is highly recommended and a “must have” for every national security and international affairs library, and for every professional interested in peacekeeping intelligence.

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Vote on Review